We study a micro-founded search model of exchange in the laboratory. Using a within subjects design, we consider exchange behavior with and without an intrinsically worthless token object. While these tokens have no redemption value, like …at money they may foster greater exchange and welfare via the coordinating role of having prices of goods in terms of tokens. We …nd that welfare is indeed improved by the presence of tokens provided that the economy starts out with a supply of such tokens. In economies that operate for some time without tokens, the later surprise introduction of tokens does not serve to improve welfare. We also explore the impact of announced changes in the economy-wide stock of tokens (…at money) on prices. Consistent with the quantity theory of money, we …nd that increases in the stock of money (tokens) have no real e¤ects and mainly result in proportionate changes to prices. However, the same …nding does not hold for decreases in the stock of money.
Introduction
The use of money in exchange is a relatively recent development in the 200,000-year history of modern humans. The earliest known use of commodity (gold) money was approximately 5,000 years ago during the Bronze age (third millennium BC) in Mesopotamia and Egypt while the earliest known use of …at (paper) money is around 800 years ago during the Song dynasty in China.
1 Prior to the development of monetary exchange, non-monetary "gift exchange" systems were the norm -see Graeber (2011) . 2 In a gift-exchange system, there is no money object and exchanges may not be direct or immediate. For example, a landowner might provide peasants with household provisions in exchange for promises of later repayment in terms of crops at harvest time. These gift exchange systems were governed by well-de…ned social norms of behavior, for example community-wide sanctioning mechanisms, and worked well so long as the extent of the market remained limited; they eventually broke down and were replaced by monetary exchange systems and explicit collateral requirements as the extent of the market broadened, agents became more specialized and community-wide enforcement became more di¢ cult to enforce -see Greif (2006) .
The conditions under which gift and monetary exchange systems can be rationalized as equilibrium outcomes has recently become the subject of a large theoretical literature in modern monetary economics employing micro-founded search-theoretic models (see Nosal and Rocheteau (2011) , Williamson and Wright (2011) and Lagos et al. (2014) for surveys). These models make clear the frictions and assumptions under which gift exchange and monetary exchange systems can be rationalized as equilibrium phenomenon. With a …nite population of agents, non-monetary gift exchange equilibria can, in principle, be sustained under the starkest of environmental conditions, namely anonymous random matching of agents, lack of commitment or enforcement and only decentralized information on exchange behavior, provided that members of the economy as a whole play according to a grim trigger "contagious strategy" as …rst suggested by Kandori (1992) and extended to the search-theoretic exchange framework by Araujo (1994) . Monetary equilibria, where intrinsically worthless token objects are used as part of the exchange process, can co-exist in such environments. However, in these same environments, monetary systems cannot achieve the …rst best outcome whereas gift exchange systems can. In particular, due to a time delay between the acceptance of money for production and the use of that money for later consumption, monetary equilibria will generally be less e¢ cient than a subset of the non-monetary gift exchange equilibria that are possible in anonymous random matching exchange economies with …nite populations of agents. Thus, in these environments, money is not essential in the sense that the introduction of money does not expand the Pareto frontier. Indeed, the addition of money to the non-monetary environment we study does not a¤ect the set of equilibria since there always exists a gift-exchange equilibrium (not involving the use of money) that implements the same equilibrium allocation as in the monetary equilibrium and results in the same welfare. 1 Eagleton and Williams (2007) . 2 As Graeber (2011) emphasizes, there is no evidence for quid-pro-quo barter exchange systems as a predecessor to monetary exchange systems in the anthropological record. In fact the evidence points to the exact opposite order of events: historically, barter exchange "has mainly been what people who are used to cash transactions do when for one reason or another they have no access to currency. " Graeber 2011, p. 40. In Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) , we explored whether gift exchange equilibria could indeed be welfare improving relative to monetary equilibria in a laboratory experiment implementing a version of Lagos and Wright's (2005) search-theoretic model of money. Despite the theoretical possibility that gift-exchange equilibria could achieve higher levels of welfare than the unique monetary equilibrium in the same environment, we found just the opposite: exchange activity and welfare were found to be higher when monetary exchange was possible than under a pure, non-monetary gift exchange system. We thus concluded that while money was not theoretically essential, behaviorally speaking money was essential to the achievement of higher welfare. We attributed that outcome to the coordinating role played by money and prices in monetary exchange systems. The experiments we reported on in that paper either had no money or a constant supply of a worthless token (…at money) object that was present in the system at all times. In this chapter, we follow up on our earlier experimental study and ask whether the introduction or the removal of a token (money) object has any e¤ect on exchange behavior and welfare. In particular, we are interested in understanding the historical transition from non-monetary gift exchange to monetary exchange as well as the reverse scenario.
In addition to exploring the essentiality of money, we further explore whether or not announced changes in the economy-wide quantity of a token money object have purely neutral e¤ects on real activity, resulting only in changes to prices, as would be consistent with the long-run "neutrality-of-money" proposition. This proposition has an even more recent history dating back to David Hume's 1752 essay, "Of Money."As Hume (1752) observed:
"If we consider any one kingdom by itself, it is evident, that the greater or less plenty of money is of no consequence; since the prices of commodities are always proportionate to the plenty of money..."
Hume's logic follows directly from the quantity theory of money. A one-time, unexpected and permanent increase in the money supply should eventually result in an adjustment in the price level only, leaving all real activity una¤ected. The main di¢ culty with testing this proposition (outside of the laboratory) is that a one-time, unexpected and permanent increase in the money supply is not easy to engineer in a natural economic setting, and indeed, we are not aware of any such naturally occurring experiments. Nevertheless, all modern, microfounded models in monetary economics, involving rational agents and markets that always clear, predict the long-run neutrality of money and so it is of interest to consider the empirical support for this proposition.
Our …rst new experimental treatment explores the transition from a non-monetary exchange economy to an economy with a constant supply of …at money and asks whether the introduction of a …at money object results in greater exchange and welfare mirroring the transition from gift-exchange to monetary exchange that was observed in human history. We also explore the reverse transition from a monetary world to a non-monetary world. Here our main experimental …nding is that economies that start o¤ without a token (money) object coordinate on low-welfare gift exchange equilibria, as we previously observed in Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) . The surprise introduction of a token (money) object midway through the experiment, however, does not increase exchange or raise welfare; instead, exchange and welfare remain low relative to the …rst best even after the token object is introduced, though subjects do use the token object in exchange. By contrast, if the economy starts out with a …xed supply of the token (…at money) object, the presence of that object in the economy results in higher amounts of exchange and higher welfare relative to economies without the token object, again consistent with the …ndings of Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) . If that token object is removed (again as a surprise) midway through the experiment, the amount of exchange drops precipitously as does the level of welfare. These …ndings suggest that money plays an important coordination role in raising welfare but only if the economy has not previously coordinated on low-welfare gift exchange equilibria. In particular, our results suggest that the exchange history of an environment into which a money object is introduced is critical as to whether or not that money object is welfare-enhancing.
Our second new experimental treatment concerns a change in the stock of the token …at money object. In particular, we place subjects in an environment with a constant total stock of M units of the …at money object and midway through the experiment we make a surprise announcement that the supply of money is doubling to 2M. We also explore the reverse sequence of events in which agents start out in an economy with a total stock of …at money of 2M units and midway through the experiment we make a surprise announcement that the supply of money is being reduced from 2M to M total units. In the case where the money supply doubles from M to 2M, we …nd that, consistent with the neutrality of money proposition, there are no real e¤ects and prices also approximately double. However, in the reverse case where the money stock is reduced by half, prices do not decline proportionally and thus there are some real e¤ects, in contrast to the neutrality of money proposition.
While the models and theory we are testing in this paper are not new, the methodology of using laboratory methods to explore exchange behavior in economies with or without money and the validity of the neutrality of money proposition is a novel approach to evaluating these models and theories. As our research demonstrates, the key advantage of using laboratory methods is that it provides us with the control necessary to implement the dynamic, intertemporal in…nite horizon search-theoretic approach to modeling monetary and non-monetary exchange, in particular, the pairwise anonymous random matching of subjects in combination with centralized Walrasian meetings. In addition, in the laboratory, it is possible to engage in policy experiments such as doubling the money supply that would be impossible (not to mention unethical) to conduct in the real world. Further, laboratory experiments provide us with a means of checking the robustness of theoretical predictions to populations of agents that may depart from the rational choice ideal in various ways. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the theoretical environment we study admits a multiplicity of gift-exchange equilibria, in addition to a unique monetary exchange equilibrium. The question of which equilibrium (if any) is selected is ultimately an empirical question that laboratory methods allow us to address.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. Section 3 describes the Lagos-Wright environment that we implement in the laboratory including the parameterization of the model and equilibrium predictions. Section 4 presents our experimental design and section 5 summarizes the main …ndings from our experiment. Finally, section 6 provides a summary of the chapter as well as some directions for future research.
Related Literature
The focus of this paper is on the essentiality and neutrality of …at money. Regarding the essentiality of money, the most closely related paper is by Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) , who also study the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange in the laboratory with a necessarily …nite population of subjects (Lagos and Wright (2005) have an in…nite continuum).
3 Given a …nite population of su¢ ciently patient agents, there exists a continuum of non-monetary gift-exchange equilibria in addition to the monetary equilibrium; these gift exchange equilibria are supported by a contagious grim-trigger strategy played by the society of agents as whole (Kandori (1992) ). Some of these gift-exchange equilibria Pareto dominate the monetary equilibrium implying that money may fail to be essential (e.g., Araujo (2004) , Aliprantis et al. (2007ab) , Araujo et al. (2012) ). However, Du¤y and Puzzello …nd that subjects avoid non-monetary gift-exchange equilibria in favor of coordinating on the monetary equilibrium. Du¤y and Puzzello also study versions of the model when money is not available (see Aliprantis et al. (2007ab) and Araujo et al. (2012) ) and …nd that welfare is signi…cantly higher in environments with money than without money, suggesting that money plays a key role as an e¢ ciency enhancing coordination device. Camera and Casari (2014) also compare outcomes across two environments, with …at money ("tickets") and without …at money. In their dynamic game, which shares some similarities with the Prisoner's Dilemma game, money is also not essential for achievement of the Pareto e¢ cient outcome which can instead be supported by social norms. The monetary environment they study involves both dynamic and distributional ine¢ ciencies associated with the …rst generation Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) money-search model in that ticket prices are exogenously …xed (there is no bargaining), money and goods are indivisible, there are restrictions on money holdings and there is only decentralized pairwise random matching (there is no centralized meeting involving all players). They also consider only small groups of 4 subjects, which may facilitate social norm mechanisms. Indeed, they …nd that the introduction of money does not improve average overall cooperation rates (exchanges) relative to an environment without money.
Neither Camera and Casari (2014) nor Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) explore what happens to patterns of exchange when money is …rst introduced and then removed, or when money is introduced at a later stage; that is, neither paper employs a within-subjects design as we do in this chapter.
Regarding the neutrality of money hypothesis, our paper is related to Lian and Plott (1998) who …nd support for the neutrality hypothesis in a general equilibrium environment using a between-subjects design. Their experiment involves a cash-in-advance constraint so that money must be used in exchange and they imbue their money object (francs) with a known redemption value, which is reminiscent of commodity money regimes. By contrast, we consider a within-subjects design, without any cash-in-advance constraints and where the token objects that can serve as money have no redemption value, as is the case in …at money systems. 4 Our study is also indirectly related to the experimental literature on money illusion. Sha…r, Diamond and Tversky (1997) collect survey data that support the conjecture that people tend to think in terms of nominal rather than real nominal values. In their study, people chose between di¤erent options presented in nominal or real terms and their reactions to variations in in ‡ation and prices indicated the presence of money illusion. Fehr and Tyran (2001) propose an experimental approach to money illusion by studying …rms'price setting behavior in a monopolistically competitive economy. They …nd that the presence of money illusion has implications for real allocations, especially after negative nominal shocks, i.e., money is not neutral after negative shocks. Similarly, Noussair et al. (2012) also …nd an asymmetry in price adjustments in response to in ‡ationary or de ‡ationary nominal shocks in experimental asset markets. Speci…cally, they report that prices exhibit nominal inertia after a de ‡ationary shock. Petersen and Winn (2014) argue that the nominal inertia observed by Fehr and Tyran (2001) is mainly due to the adaptive nature of …rms'best responses rather than money illusion per se, but Fehr and Tyran (2014) argue that this is too narrow an interpretation. By contrast, in this paper we provide a test of the neutrality of money proposition in a more explicit, exchange-oriented setting, where agents must bargain over quantities and prices. In particular we study the Lagos and Wright (2005) search model of money, where money may or may not be used for exchange purposes. We …nd some quali…ed support for the neutrality of money proposition in response to in ‡ationary shocks. However, consistent with the earlier experimental literature, we also …nd that prices do not adjust downward in response to a de ‡ationary shock.
The Lagos-Wright Environment
In this section, we describe a modi…ed version of the Lagos and Wright (2005) model with a …nite population of agents. Time is discrete and the horizon is in…nite. Let the population consist of 2N in…nitely lived agents and let 2 (0; 1) denote the discount factor. Each period is divided into two subperiods. In the …rst subperiod agents interact in decentralized meetings while in the second subperiod trade is organized via a centralized meeting.
In the …rst subperiod agents are randomly and bilaterally matched and every agent in a pair is either a producer or a consumer of a special good in his match with equal probability. Note that this generates gains from trade since agents cannot produce for their own consumption. We denote by x and y consumption and production in the …rst subperiod. In the second subperiod, agents trade in a centralized meeting (Walrasian market) and every agent can produce and consume a general good. Let X and Y denote production and consumption in the second subperiod.
Preferences are given by
where u, and c are twice continuously di¤erentiable with u 0 > 0; c 0 > 0; u 00 < 0; c 00 0: There exists a q 2 (0; 1) such that u 0 (q ) = c 0 (q ), i.e., q is e¢ cient as it maximizes the surplus yield agents any utility.
in a pair. Also, let q > 0 be such that u(q) = c(q).
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Furthermore, the goods produced during the two subperiods are perfectly divisible and nonstorable. There is another object called …at money that is perfectly divisible and storable in any amount m 0. We will consider two environments: one where the money supply is …xed at M and one where the money supply is twice as large and …xed at 2M . Notice that the environment lacks commitment and formal enforcement. However, since our population is …nite, in addition to the monetary equilibrium, there exist multiple non-monetary equilibria supported by informal enforcement schemes (see Kandori (1992) , Ellison (1994) , Aliprantis et al. (2007ab) and Araujo et al. (2012) ).
In what follows, we just report the main theoretical predictions and we refer the interested reader to Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) for further details and proofs.
Monetary Equilibrium
In the Lagos-Wright model, there always exists a non-monetary, autarkic equilibrium where money is not used and there is no exchange of goods. In addition, there exists a monetary equilibrium involving positive exchange of goods for money which we describe in this section. Let t denote the price of money in terms of the general good in the centralized meeting. Under the assumption of a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining protocol in the decentralized meeting (which we use in the experiment and where the consumer has all the bargaining power), it can be shown that the monetary steady state is unique. The amount e q of the special good exchanged for money in each decentralized meeting in the steady state is pinned down by the following functional equation
Supposing that the aggregate supply of money is M , the equilibrium price of money in the centralized meeting in the steady state is = . Furthermore, periodic access to the centralized market and quasilinearity imply that agents are able to perfectly rebalance their money holdings: the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of each decentralized meeting is therefore degenerate at
Because of discounting ( < 1), the …rst best is not achieved as a monetary equilibrium, in the absence of the Friedman rule.
Note that if the money supply is instead doubled to 2M , the prices of goods in the decentralized and centralized meeting double but production and consumption equilibrium quantities remain unchanged, i.e., money is neutral in this model. To see this more clearly, notice that equation 1 does not directly depend on the value of M . 5 The original Lagos and Wright model has a positive probability, (1 ), that agents remain unmatched, a positive probability of double coincidence meetings and a probability of being a consumer or a producer. We simplify the model as we set = 1, = 0, and = 1=2. This does not a¤ect the qualitative results.
Social Norms in the Lagos-Wright Environment
The model in the previous section can also be described as an in…nitely repeated trading game. It is easy to see that producing zero regardless of the history of play is always an equilibrium, i.e., autarky remains an equilibrium. However, there also exist non-monetary, pure "gift-exchange"equilibria that sustain positive amounts of production and consumption (including the …rst-best) as sequential Nash equilibria through the use of a community-wide contagious strategy mechanism (see Kandori (1992) , Ellison (1993) and Araujo (2004) ). In order to describe these equilibria, we assume that consumers propose terms of trade so that their action set is given by
6 The action set of producers is identi…ed with f0; 1g where 0 stands for reject and 1 stands for accept.
Let 0 <be some positive amount of production and consumption in the decentralized meetings. Consider a strategy that prescribes to shut down the centralized meeting and to participate only in decentralized meetings. In the latter meetings, the strategy prescribes that consumers propose (q; 0) and producers accept (q; 0), so long as they have always observed these proposals being accepted in past meetings. As soon as a deviation is observed, then the strategy prescribes rejection of any proposal forever after whenever an agent is in the producer role. As in Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) , we label this strategy as a decentralized gift-giving social norm, since it only relies on contagion being spread by means of decentralized interactions. It is possible to show that this social norm is supported as a sequential equilibrium if agents are patient enough (see Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) ).
The intuition behind this result is as in Kandori (1992) , namely that cooperation can be supported since a single deviation by an agent implies that any agent who has observed it stops producing whenever a producer and thus, defection spreads like an epidemic that eventually hits the whole community leading to autarky. The threat of triggering such a contagious reaction can su¢ ce to support a cooperative gift exchange social norm of the type characterized above.
The no-money environment
In addition to studying the Lagos-Wright model, we also study a variant of this environment, due to Araujo, Camargo, Minetti and Puzzello (2012) where there is no money. In the decentralized meetings of this environment, consumers propose quantities that producers should produce for them so that a consumer's action set is again given by [0; q] : The action set of producers is again identi…ed with f0; 1g where 0 stands for reject and 1 stands for accept. Following the decentralized meeting, agents can choose whether to participate in the centralized trading post for the general good. Since this is not an endowment economy, agents …rst choose whether to produce 0 y Y units of the general good, where Y denotes the upper bound on production. Second, they decide how much to bid, b, for the general good with the constraint that their bid cannot exceed their production, i.e., 0 b y. The price of the centralized meeting general good is determined by the ratio of the sum of bids to the sum of individual production amounts i.e., p = y. Let 0 <be a positive amount of production and consumption in decentralized meetings. The decentralized gift-giving social norm remains a sequential equilibrium of the trading game. In addition to decentralized social norms, there also exist centralized social norms where the trading post price in the centralized meeting can be used a signaling device. It is possible to show that if agents are su¢ ciently patient, positive amounts of production and consumption (including the …rst best) can be supported as sequential equilibria (see Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) for details). Contagion under these social norms is much faster thus implying that good allocations can be supported with lower thresholds for the discount factor than in the case of the decentralized social norms of the Lagos-Wright environment.
Parameterization and Equilibrium Benchmarks
As in most sessions of Du¤y and Puzzello, we considered a population of 2N = 14 subjects. The utility function (cost function) in the decentralized meeting was given by u(q) = A ln(1+ q) (c(q) = Cq). We set A = 7; C = 1, and = , again following the choices made in our earlier paper. The aggregate supply of money was given by M = 112 (with an initial endowment of money per capita of M=2N = 8) and it remained constant in the money treatment part of sessions contrasting money with no money. In our treatments involving the neutrality of money proposition, we considered environments where the money supply doubled from M = 112 to 2M = 224 (with an initial endowment per capita of M=2N = 16) or the reverse scenario where the initial supply of money was 2M = 224 and then dropped to M = 112:
Given these parameter choices, the …rst best quantity is q = 6, while the equilibrium quantity associated with the monetary equilibrium is e q = 4. The upper bound for the special good in the DM is q = 22 7 . We also chose an upper bound of Y = 22 for the CM. Regarding prices, the equilibrium price of the special good in the decentralized meeting is given by p = and so the equilibrium price of the general good in terms of money is the reciprocal P = 2: When M is doubled, prices are doubled but the equilibrium quantity associated with the monetary equilibrium remains e q = 4: Finally, for the purpose of calculating welfare, we note that the period monetary equilibrium payo¤ per pair is v = f7 log 5 4g = 7:26 and the period …rst best payo¤ per pair is v = f7 log 7 6g = 7:62. Thus, the monetary equilibrium is predicted to achieve 95.3 percent of the welfare under the …rst best equilibrium.
Regarding social norm equilibria, the lowest value of the discount factors, , for which the …rst best can be supported are given by CM = 0:6427 and DM = 0:8256, where the superscript refers to our focus on the centralized or decentralized, non-monetary social norm. Our choice for = 5 6 exceeds both of these minimal threshold discount factors, so that the …rst best can be supported as a sequential Nash equilibrium under both types of social norms, decentralized and centralized (see Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) for more details).
In addition to the …rst best, lower but positive production and consumption levels, q, in the decentralized meeting can also be supported as sequential, non-monetary social norm equilibria under our parameterization of the model. Tables 1 and 2 summarize equilibrium predictions for quantities and prices under the various types of equilibria that are possible in the Lagos-Wright environment that we implemented in the laboratory.
Group Decentralized Monetary Autarkic Size
Social Norm Equilibrium Equilibrium N = 14 0:5 q 6 q = 4 q = 0 
Experimental Design
The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007) ). Each session involved 2N = 14 subjects drawn from the undergraduate population of the University of Pittsburgh. No subject had any prior experience with any of the treatment environments of our experiment; subjects were only allowed to participate in a single experimental session. Our experiment involved a within-subjects design where each session had subjects participate in two distinct treatments or "parts"as they were referred to in the instructions. Prior to each treatment/part subjects were given written instructions which were read aloud in an e¤ort to make these instructions public knowledge.
8 Subjects also had to answer comprehensive quiz questions to con…rm their familiarity with the environment. Mistaken answers to quiz questions were reviewed aloud in an e¤ort to minimize mistakes due to comprehension problems.
The experiment consists of four di¤erent, within-subject treatments each consisting of two parts. In the "NM-M" treatment, the …rst part of the session consisted of several inde…nite sequences of the no-money (NM) environment. The second part consisted of several inde…nite sequences of the money (M) environment. In the "M-NM"treatment, the two parts were reversed: the …rst part consisted of several inde…nite sequences of the money (M) environment followed by a second part involving several inde…nite sequences of the no money (NM) environment. In the "M-2M" treatment, the …rst part consisted of several inde…nite sequences of the money (M) environment (as in the M-NM treatment), while the second part consisted of several inde…nite sequences of the 2M environment, where the only change was that the money supply was doubled. Finally, the "2M-M"treatment considered the reverse order where the …rst part of the session involved the 2M environment and the second part involved the M environment, i.e., the money supply was cut in half. In all four cases, subjects were not informed about the nature of the environment they would face in the second part of the experiment until the …rst part had been concluded. That is, the changes in the environment of the second part of the study can be regarded as being unknown to subjects in advance.
As noted, each part of a session consisted of several "supergames" which we referred to in the written instructions as "sequences". Each sequence consisted of an inde…nite number of repetitions (periods) of a stage game. Each stage game involved 2 rounds, a decentralized meeting round and a centralized meeting round. Every sequence began with the play of at least one, two-round stage game. At the end of each stage game, the sequence continued with another repetition (period) of the stage game with probability and ended with probability (1 ). If a sequence ended, subjects were told that "depending on the time available", a new inde…nite sequence would begin. Speci…cally, our computer program drew a random number uniformly from the set f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g ; and this was explained to subjects as simulating the roll of a six-sided die. If the number drawn was not a 6, then the sequence continued with another round; otherwise, if a 6 was drawn, the sequence ended. In this manner we induced a discount factor or continuation probability of = 5=6.
9
In practice, we let our computer program determine the inde…nite sequence lengths using the random termination method in the very …rst experimental session reported on in this chapter in real-time, that is without any intervention on our part. We then hard-coded in these exact same sequence lengths for all remaining sessions, so as to minimize di¤erences across our sessions due to varying sequence lengths.
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At the start of each and every new inde…nite sequence of our money, M; or doubled money, 2M; environments, prior to the …rst decentralized meeting round, each subject in our Lagos-Wright economy was endowed with either M=2N "tokens" or 2M=2N tokens, depending on the treatment.
11 In these sessions, subjects were also informed about the total number of tokens, M = 112 or 2M = 224. They were also informed that the total token quantity was …xed and that they would not get any further endowment of tokens for the duration of that sequence. Subjects were further instructed that if a sequence ended, their 9 This random termination method for implementing in…nitely repeated games in the laboratory is due to Roth and Murnighan (1978) . See Fréchette and Yuksel (2013) for a comparison of random termination (RT) with other, theoretically equivalent methods; RT is found to generate the highest levels of cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
10 Variations in sequence (supergame) lengths can have an e¤ect on the extent of cooperative behavior as documented by Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game experiments and by Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) in repeated trust game experiments. Holding the sequence lengths constant across treatments as is also done by Fréchette and Yuksel (2013) , helps to minimize such variations, so that any observed di¤erences in within-subject behavior can be attributed to treatment changes alone. This design choice was also necessitated by our use of a within-subjects design, as we had to ensure that we would be able to read instructions for and implement two di¤erent inde…nitely repeated game environments within the period of time that we had recruited subjects for each experimental session.
11 While we will refer to experimental sessions involving tokens as the "money"treatment sessions, we were careful to avoid all use of the term "money" in the experimental instructions or on computer screens. token balances would be set to zero. However, if a sequence continued with a new period, their token balance, as of the end of the last period, would carry over to the new period of the sequence. In the no-money (N M ) environment, there was no money and thus no initial endowments of or instructions regarding tokens.
Within a period (stage game), the decentralized meeting round began with a random pairwise matching of all 2N subjects to form N pairs. Within each pair, one player was chosen with probability 1=2 to be the producer and the other player was designated as the consumer for that round. We suggested that subjects think of this determination as the result of a coin ‡ip and recognize that they would be a consumer (producer) in one half of all decentralized meeting rounds, on average. Subjects were instructed that all random pairings and assignments were equally likely. For the decentralized meeting we induced the utility function u(q) = A log(1 + q) over consumption and the cost function c(q) = Cq over production of the decentralized good. These functions were presented to subjects in a payo¤ table showing how a certain quantity q of the decentralized good translated into a positive number, A log(1 + q), of "points" in the case of consumption or a negative number, Cq, of points in the case of production. Subjects were instructed in how to use that table to calculate their earnings in various scenarios. At the start of each session each subject was given an initial endowment of 20 points so as to minimize the possibility that any subject ended up with a negative point balance; indeed, we can report that no subject ended any of our experimental sessions with a negative point balance. Importantly, subjects were speci…cally instructed that "Tokens have no value in terms of points," that is, tokens had no redemption value. Like …at money, tokens were intrinsically worthless with regard to the points that subjects accrued over the course of a session (from consumption and less production) and it was these point totals that were used to determine subjects' earnings from the experiment. Notice that the environment is potentially merciless in the sense that if no producer agrees to produce, there is no consumption and hence no points earned by any agent.
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Consumers moved …rst and were asked to form a "proposal"as to how much of the decentralized good they wanted their randomly matched producer to produce for them and in the money treatments, how many tokens, if any, the consumer was willing to o¤er the producer for the quantity requested. Consumers were informed of both their own and their matched producer's current token balances prior to formulating their proposal. Consumers were restricted to requesting quantities of the decentralized good, q, in the interval [0; q] though fractional units were allowed. In the money treatments they could also o¤er their matched producer d units of their current period token balance as part of their proposal. It was made clear that token (money) o¤erings were voluntary; subjects were instructed that the amount of tokens o¤ered, d, could range between 0 and their currently available token balance, inclusive, and that fractional units were also allowed. Thus, each consumer formulated a proposal, (q; d) in treatments with money and a proposal, q, in the no money treatments, which was then anonymously transmitted to their matched producer.
Producers moved second and were …rst informed of their matched consumer's proposal. Producers were further informed about the consumer's bene…t from receiving the proposed quantity q, u(q); and of their own cost from producing quantity q, c(q). In the money treatment, producers were also informed of both the consumer's and their own currently available token balances as well as the quantity of tokens, d, the consumer was o¤ering them in exchange for producing q units. Producers then had to decide whether to accept or reject the consumer's proposal. If the producer accepted the proposal, then it was implemented: producers produced quantity q at a cost to themselves of c(q) points. The consumer consumed quantity q yielding him or her a bene…t of u(q) points. In the money treatments the proposed quantity of tokens, d, if positive, was transferred from the consumer to the producer. If the producer rejected the proposal then no exchange took place; both members of the pair earned 0 points for the round and in the money treatments, their token balances remained unchanged. At the end of the decentralized round, subjects were informed of the outcome of that round: in particular, they were informed as to whether the proposal was accepted or not and were updated on any changes to their cumulative point totals. In the money treatments they also learned of any changes to their token balances. After this feedback was communicated, the decentralized round was over and the centralized meeting round began.
Within a period (stage game), the second, centralized meeting round brought together all 2N participants to participate in the meeting for the homogeneous and perishable "good X". Trade in the centralized meeting was organized via a trading post or "market game" as in Shapley and Shubik (1977) . The speci…c trading post set up in our environment follows that of Green and Zhou (2005) and depends on whether subjects were in a money or no money environment. At the start of the centralized round, all subjects were asked whether they wanted to participate in the centralized trading post meeting. If they agreed to participate then they decided how much they wanted to produce of good X for the trading post, say y 0. After that, subjects had to decide how much they wished to bid, b, for units of good X. In the no money environment, each subject was instructed that their individual bid, b i , for units of good X could be any amount up to and including y i , the number of units they had already committed to produce, i.e., 0 6 b i 6 y i : In the money treatment, bids for good X had to be in money units and subjects were instructed that they could bid any amount of their currently available money holdings, m i , but that their bid could not exceed their money holdings, i.e., 0 6 b i 6 m i . After every subject had submitted their decisions, the market price of good X was determined by P =
: Subjects were further instructed that P = 0 if P b i = 0 or if P y i = 0 or both, in which case no trade took place. The realized payo¤ in the centralized meeting was known to be given by U (b; y; P ) = b P y since consumption is determined by b P and preferences are linear in the centralized meeting. In the money environment, token holdings at the beginning of the next decentralized meeting, m 0 , were given by money holdings at the beginning of the previous centralized meeting, plus any proceeds from sales, minus any amount of tokens bid: m 0 = m + P y b. As the population size, N , grows large, the theoretical predictions remain the same as for the Lagos and Wright (2005) model.
Points were subtracted or added to subjects'point totals from the decentralized meeting round.
Following the completion of the centralized meeting round, subjects were updated on their new point totals or token holdings. Then a random number was drawn from the set f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. If the random number drawn was not 6, the sequence continued on with another 2-round period. In the money treatment, subjects'token balances as of the end of the centralized meeting were carried over to the decentralized round of the next period in the sequence. If the random number drawn was a 6, then the sequence ended. In the money treatment if a sequence ended, token balances were set to zero.
Subjects were instructed that once a sequence ended, depending on the time available a new inde…nite sequence might begin. In each new sequence of a money treatment, all subjects would start the new sequence with M=14 = 8 tokens, or 2M=14 = 16 tokens depending on whether it was the M or 2M treatment. Point totals, however, were not re-initialized between sequences and carried over from one sequence to the next. Approximately mid-way through each session, the experimenter announced the conclusion of the …rst part, which came only at the end of an inde…nite sequence (when a 6 was rolled). Instructions for the second part were then handed out and read aloud. The second part also consisted of a number of inde…nite sequences, and subjects earned points in both the decentralized and centralized meetings of the second part of the session just as they had in …rst part; there was no change in the utility bene…ts from consumption or the costs of production in either the decentralized or centralized meetings of each part of a session of this experiment. The only changes were with regard to the presence or absence of money or the total stock of money in circulation. Following the completion of the second and …nal part of the session, subjects answered a brief questionnaire and were then paid their accumulated point earnings from all sequences played in both parts of the session along with a $5 show-up payment. Subjects'cumulative point totals from all periods of all sequences played were converted into cash at the end of the session at the …xed and known exchange rate of 1 token = $0.20. Average total earnings were $24.54 (standard deviation of $6.06) for an approximately 2.5 hour session.
Experimental Results
We report on data from 12 experimental sessions. As each session involved 14 subjects, we have data from a total of 168 subjects. Some characteristics of our 12 experimental sessions are given in Table 3 . As the table reveals, we had 3 sessions of each of the four treatments. The …rst and second parts of each session are indicated in this table but are also re ‡ected in the names given to each session, where NM=no money, M=money and 2M=twice money. Hence, "NM-M-1" is the session number 1 of the treatment where the …rst part was the no money (NM) environment and the second part was the money (M) environment. In addition, Table 3 reports the sequence lengths and total number of periods in each part of each session. Recall that after the …rst session, we hard-coded the sequence lengths and thus the total number of periods for each part and we kept these sequence lengths constant across sessions. For instance, in the NM-M treatment sessions, the …rst part always consisted of three sequences of lengths 6, 2, and 7 periods for a total of 15 periods. The second part always consisted of two sequences of lengths 4 and 12 periods for a total of 16 periods. Thus, combining the …rst and second parts, each session involved 31 periods, with each period involving both a decentralized meeting (DM) round followed by a centralized meeting (CM) round.
Our experiment has yielded a number of interesting results which we summarize as several di¤erent …ndings. 
NM-M and M-NM Treatments
We begin with an analysis of behavior in the NM-M and M-NM treatment sessions. Recall that in these sessions there was either no money (NM) or a constant total stock of 112 units of …at money (M) or 8 units per capita. Our …rst …nding concerns the acceptance of DM o¤ers by producers in these sessions.
Finding 1
The frequency with which DM o¤ers are accepted in the NM-M and M-NM treatments is independent of whether or not there is a money object or of the treatment ordering.
Support for Finding 1 comes from the second and …fth columns of Table 4 which reports the mean DM o¤er acceptance frequencies (DM Accept) in the No Money (NM) or Money (M) parts of the three NM-M and M-NM sessions. Using the six pairs (NM, M) of mean acceptance frequencies for each of the six sessions, a Wilcoxon signed ranks test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no di¤erence in acceptance frequencies between the NM or M parts of each of these sessions (p = :753). This result is also con…rmed by the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test on the acceptance frequencies of the …rst part of the NM-M or M-NM treatment sessions (p = :5).
Further support comes from the …rst column of Table 5 which reports the results of a GLS regression analysis of individual producers' acceptance decisions in all periods of all NM-M and M-NM sessions. The …rst column reports results of a regression of the producer's DM o¤er acceptance decision on a constant and two dummy variables: M, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the economy had money and OrderM-NM a second dummy variable equal to 1 if the treatment order of the session was M in the …rst part and NM in the second part. Our random e¤ects regression analysis on individual subject data involved robust clustering of standard errors on each of the six sessions. The results in the …rst column of Table 5 indicate that the mean DM acceptance frequency was 37.8 percent (the coe¢ cient on the constant term), and that the presence or absence of money or the treatment ordering were We next consider whether the presence or absence of …at money (tokens) has an e¤ect on the DM quantities that producers agreed to produce for their matched consumers, i.e., on traded DM quantities. Table 4 show the mean quantities traded in the DM market of the NM or M treatments. Notice that mean traded DM quantities in the M part of each session are, with a single exception (session NM-M-3), greater than mean traded DM quantities in the NM part of each session. While we do not have enough session-level observations to establish whether these di¤erences are statistically di¤erent from one another at conventional signi…cance levels, our random e¤ects regression analysis of individual traded quantities from the six NM-M and M-NM sessions (with clustering of errors on session-level observations) suggests that the presence of money positively a¤ects the DM quantity traded. In particular, the third column of Table 5 reports on a regression of DM quantity traded on the same two dummy variables used to understand exchange decisions. As the regression results indicate, the baseline no-money mean traded quantity is 1.068 units (the coe¢ cient on the intercept term in the regression) and this amount is substantially increased by an additional 1.706 units (for a total of 2.774 units) when money is present as indicated by the statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the M dummy term. Notice further that, in support of the second statement of Finding 2, the treatment order also matters for the DM traded quantity as indicated by the signi…cantly positive coe¢ cient of 1. Intuitively, in the NM-M treatment in the initial absence of money-the …rst NM part of this treatment-subjects coordinated on a low level DM quantity to trade. The introduction of money in the second M part of the NM-M treatment sessions did not succeed in increasing the DM quantity by very much as is more clearly revealed in Table 4 where the overall average DM traded quantity was 1.792 units in the NM part and only slightly higher at 1.819 units in the M part. On the other hand, in the M-NM treatment sessions, the presence of a stock of money resulted in a much greater traded DM quantity in the M part; the average of the session observations was 4.585 units which again is close to the monetary equilibrium prediction of 4 units and much greater than the 1.7292 units traded on average in the …rst part of the NM-M treatment sessions. Furthermore, when money was removed from the economy in the second part of the M-NM treatment sessions, there was a precipitous dropo¤ in the mean DM quantity traded, from 4.585 units down to an average of 1.051 units again as revealed in Table 4 . This lower level of traded DM quantity is more typical of the NM treatment sessions and also in line with the quantities reported in Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) .
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
As an alternative comparison, let us focus on just the …rst part of each of the six NM-M or M-NM treatment sessions. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the mean traded DM quantities in the …rst part of each of these six sessions using the relevant data reported in Table 4 . This Figure makes it clear that mean traded DM quantities are much larger in the …rst part of the M-NM treatment sessions where there was a constant stock of …at money (M) as compared with the …rst part of the NM-M treatment sessions where there was no …at money (NM). Indeed, a Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test on the six session-level averages con…rms this impression; we can reject the null of no di¤erence in mean traded quantities in favor of the alternative that mean traded DM quantities are higher with money than without money in the …rst parts of these sessions (p = :10, two-sided test, smallest p-value with just three observations per treatment).
A consequence of Findings 1-2 is that welfare is higher in economies that start out with a supply of the token money object (as in our M-NM treatment) as compared with economies that do not start out with a supply of the token money object (as in our NM-M treatment), which is consistent with Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) . Furthermore, in economies that start out with a token object, welfare drops signi…cantly when that token object is later taken away as in the M-NM treatment sessions. However, the same is not true in the reverse-order NM-M treatment sessions; in the latter, the low quantity exchanged in the …rst NM part of the session spills over to the second, M part of the session, where DM quantities are not much di¤erent and consequently there is not much improvement in welfare. We summarize this result as follows:
Finding 3 Welfare is higher with money than without money in the M-NM treatment sessions where money is introduced in the …rst part. However, in the NM-M treatment sessions where money is only later introduced in the second part, welfare is not improved by the introduction of money. Table 4 , speci…cally from the welfare measure reported under the heading "Welfare"which indicates the percentage of the …rst best level of welfare that subjects were able to achieve in the …rst and in the second parts of the NM-M and M-NM treatments. 13 We observe that welfare is higher in the …rst part of the M-NM treatments where there is a supply of money than in the second part where there is no money. On the other hand, if the economy starts without money, as in the …rst part of the NM-M treatment sessions, the introduction of money does not seem to be welfare-improving. Further con…rmation of these impressions is provided in Table 6 where we use welfare ratios for every period of the NM-M and M-NM sessions as a dependent variable in a …xed e¤ects regression that clusters errors at the session level. 14 The regression in the …rst column (Both NM-M, M-NM) uses period welfare ratios from all six NM-M and M-NM sessions combined. There we …nd that, over all sessions, the presence of money is welfare improving as indicated by the positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the M dummy variable (representing the treatment where money was present). We also …nd that, consistent with Table 4 , the treatment order matters; welfare is higher in the M-NM treatment order as compared with the NM-M treatment order as indicated by the coe¢ cient on the OrderM-NM dummy variable. In the second and third columns of Table 6 , we focus on just the NM-M or M-NM treatment session data separately. There we see con…rmation 13 The welfare measure is calculated using utility bene…ts and costs in points accrued by all subjects over all supergames and periods of each of the six sessions. That amount is then divided by the number of points that could have been earned had subjects played according to the …rst best equilibrium where a quantity of q = 6 is exchanged in every decentralized meeting. 14 We use period-level data rather than individual-level data in these regressions since at the individuallevel, there will be those who bene…t, i.e., consumers in the DM and those who incur losses, i.e. producers in the DM. The period level welfare ratio aggregates these individual bene…ts and losses and thus provides a better measure of welfare per period. 0.01 0.34 *,**,*** = signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table 6 : Regression Analysis of Period-by-Period Welfare Ratios in the NM-M and M-NM Sessions that in the NM-M treatment order, the introduction of money has no signi…cant impact on the welfare ratio. However, in the M-NM treatment order, the introduction of money has a signi…cant impact on the welfare ratio and this e¤ect is so large that it also obtains in the combined data sample in the …rst column. The …nding that welfare is not increasing with the introduction of money in the NM-M treatment order appears attributable to the negligible increase in DM traded quantities in the second part of the NM-M treatment sessions in combination with a slight decrease in DM o¤er acceptances from the …rst NM part to the second M part -see Table 4 . It appears that, once established, social norms of low-level gift exchange are very di¢ cult to abandon and may persist despite the introduction of money (and therefore prices).
Support for Finding 3 comes from
Regarding prices in the NM-M and M-NM treatments, Table 7 reports mean DM trade prices (for the M part of each session only) along with CM market prices for both the NM and M parts. Recall from Table 2 that for our parameterization of the model, the monetary equilibrium prediction when M=2N = 8 (as in the M parts of these sessions) is for both the DM price, p and CM price, P , to equal 2. We observe that for the M part of the M-NM treatment sessions, the mean DM price is 1.484, which is close to, but lower than the monetary equilibrium prediction of 2. The CM price in the M part of these sessions is however very close to 2, averaging 2.067 across the three M-NM treatment sessions (the median is 2.053. This evidence not only con…rms that money is being used (otherwise there would be no DM prices), but suggests that subjects were close to coordinating on the unique monetary equilibrium in the M part of the M-NM treatment sessions.
By contrast, prices in the M part of the NM-M treatment sessions are at odds with the monetary equilibrium predictions; as Table 7 reveals, DM trade prices are greater than 2, averaging 2.865 and CM prices are considerably higher, averaging 7.861, though the median CM price is lower, at 4.371. These greater-than-predicted prices in the M part of the NM-M treatment are really just a re ‡ection of the fact that DM traded quantities are too low in the M part of the NM-M treatment sessions relative to the monetary equilibrium prediction of 4 units traded per period; with lower-than-equilibrium DM traded quantities and a constant money supply, both DM and CM prices will necessarily be higher than equilibrium predictions. In the NM part of both the M-NM and NM-M treatment sessions, CM prices are very close to 1, re ‡ecting a common strategy that subjects o¤er to bid for as many units of the centralized good X as they o¤ered to produce; in the NM part of these sessions, there is no need to re-balance monetary holdings and so the price is valuable only as a signal of the coordinated behavior of market participants in the centralized meeting.
As suggested in the introduction, the natural order of events in human history was that non-monetary gift exchange regimes preceded the current, modern …at money regime of impersonal exchange. However, when we implement such a regime change in the laboratory (from NM to M) we …nd that while money is used and there is (in two of three sessions) a slight increase in the amount of DM exchange, the behavior of subjects departs considerably from the new and unique monetary equilibrium prediction and there is no welfare improvement. On the other hand, if, counter to history, we start with a supply of money, then behavior conforms more closely to the monetary equilibrium predictions for the M part of that treatment and taking away money in the second part leads to a signi…cant drop-o¤ in exchange and welfare. We speculate that the adjustment from the NM to the M regime may take longer than is allowed for in the compressed time frame of our experimental study. We further note that monetary exchange systems often involve an intermediate transition phase from a regime of pure gift exchange to one of commodity money and then on to …at money as opposed to the more stark transition that we attempt to engineer from a pure gift exchange economy to one involving only …at money. We would add that monetary regimes are often accompanied by legal restrictions requiring the use of money (e.g. to pay taxes) and that such restrictions are completely absent in the framework that we study here. These omissions are potentially important factors in understanding our …nding of treatment order e¤ects.
M-2M and 2M-M Treatments
We now turn to our second main treatment exploring the neutrality of money proposition as …rst set forth by Hume and which plays a fundamental role in the quantity theory of money. Recall that in these treatments, the total money stock was either 112 total units, or 8 units per capita as in the M treatment, or twice this amount, 224 total units, or 16 units per capita as in the 2M treatment. Our …rst …nding concerns the acceptance of DM o¤ers in these treatments.
Finding 4 There is no di¤erence in DM o¤er acceptance rates between the …rst and second parts of either the M-2M or the 2M-M treatments. Tables 8 and 9 . The second and …fth columns of Table 8 report mean DM o¤er acceptance frequencies by producers in the M-2M and 2M-M treatments; these acceptance frequencies are all quite similar, lying between .425 and .473 on average. Indeed, a Wilcoxon signed ranks test on matched pairs of acceptance frequencies yields no signi…cant di¤erence (p = 0:75 for both M-2M and 2M-M). Further support comes from the …rst column of Table 9 which reports the results of a random e¤ects regression of producer's DM o¤er acceptance decisions on a constant and two dummy variables: 2M, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the money supply was 2M, and Order2M-M a second dummy variable equal to 1 if the treatment order of the session was 2M in the …rst part and M in the second part. The regression results in the …rst column of Table 9 suggest that the mean DM o¤er acceptance frequency is 46.7 percent and that neither the doubling of the money supply nor the treatment order has any e¤ect on DM o¤er acceptance frequencies as indicated by the insigni…cance of the coe¢ cients on the 2M and Order2M-M dummy variables.
Support for Finding 4 comes from
We next consider whether the change in the money supply has any real e¤ects on DM traded quantities. Tables 8 and 9 . Table 8 suggests that mean DM traded quantities (DM q) in the …rst part of the M-2M and 2M-M treatment sessions are very similar to one another and are close to the monetary equilibrium prediction of 4 DM units exchanged; these mean quantities from the …rst parts of all M-2M and 2M-M sessions are also illustrated in Figure 2 . Indeed, a Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test using the six session-level observations illustrated in Figure 2 indicates that we cannot reject the null of no di¤erence in DM traded quantities between the …rst (M) part of the M-2M treatment sessions and the …rst (2M) part of the 2M-M treatment sessions (p = :275) suggesting that a doubling of the money supply has no real e¤ects on DM traded quantities, at least in the …rst part of these sessions.
Support for Finding 5 comes from
[Insert Figure 2 here].
On the other hand, we observe in Table 8 that there is some drop-o¤ in the mean DM traded quantities in the second parts of both the M-2M and the 2M-M treatment sessions and that in support of the second statement of Finding 5 this decline appears to be much larger in the second part of the 2M-M treatment sessions as compared with the second part of the M-2M treatment sessions.
Further evidence in support of Finding 5 comes from the third column of Table 9 which reports on a regression of DM traded quantities on the same two dummy variables used to understand exchange decisions. The regression results indicate that the baseline quantity of DM exchange in the M treatment is 3.631 units, which is again close to the monetary equilibrium prediction of 4 units. A doubling of the money supply does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on this quantity as indicated by the statistical insigni…cance of the coe¢ cient on the 2M dummy variable. However, in support of the last statement of Finding 5, we also observe 0.01 0.04 *,**,*** = signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table 10 : Regression Analysis of Period-by-Period Welfare Ratios in the M-2M and 2M-M Sessions that the coe¢ cient estimate on the treatment order dummy, Order2M-M, is signi…cantly negative; the latter …nding means that mean traded quantities in the DM market are .972 of a unit lower if the treatment order was 2M-M as opposed to the baseline M-2M order. This same …nding is also found in Table 8 where DM q is lower in both the 2M and M parts of the 2M-M treatment sessions as compared with the M and 2M parts of the M-2M treatment sessions.
An implication of Findings 4 and 5 is the following:
Finding 6 Welfare is una¤ected by the doubling of the money supply in the M-2M treatments but is reduced by the reduction of the money supply in the 2M-M treatments.
Support for Finding 6 comes from the welfare session averages reported in Table 8 . There we see that for the M-2M treatment sessions, there is not much change in our welfare measure (percentage of the …rst best welfare achieved) as the money supply was doubled from M to 2M. Indeed, using the three pairs of welfare measures for the three M-2M treatment sessions, a two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test indicates that we cannot reject the null of no di¤erence in welfare between the M and 2M parts of these treatments (p = :75). However, applying the same test to the three pairs of welfare measures for the 2M-M treatment sessions, we …nd that welfare is lower in the M part as compared with the 2M part (p = :25, which is the lowest p-value possible with just three observations). The latter …nding is mainly attributable to the large fall-o¤ in the DM quantity traded in the M part of two of the three 2M-M sessions, since acceptance rates do not vary too much across the M and 2M treatments.
Disaggregating further, Table 10 reports …xed e¤ects regressions with clustering of standard errors on individual sessions where the dependent variable is the period-by-period welfare ratios relative to the …rst best welfare in the M-2M and 2M-M sessions regressed on treatment dummy variables (as was done earlier in Table 6 for the NM-M and M-NM treatment sessions). Combining all data from the M-2M and 2M-M sessions (…rst column) we see that the impact of the treatment change from M to 2M has no e¤ect on period welfare ratios as indicated by the insigni…cance of the 2M dummy (equal to 1 in the 2M treatment). On the other hand, we note that the coe¢ cient on the order dummy variable, Order2M-M, is negative and signi…cant, indicating a treatment order e¤ect wherein welfare is lower if the order is 2M-M as opposed to the baseline M-2M treatment ordering. Indeed, decomposing the data further by the treatment order, we see in the second and third columns that period welfare measures are una¤ected by the doubling of the money supply in the M-2M treatment sessions, but that welfare is higher in the 2M part of the 2M-M treatment sessions than in the M part of those same sessions. The latter …nding is mainly attributable to the large fall-o¤ in the DM quantity traded in the M part of two of the three 2M-M sessions, since acceptance rates do not vary too much across the M and 2M treatments.
A further implication of the neutrality-of-money-proposition is that prices should double in the 2M treatment relative to the M treatment. This prediction should hold for both the DM and CM prices. We again …nd some mixed support for this prediction:
Finding 7 In the M-2M treatment, decentralized and centralized market prices approximately double with the doubling of the total money stock from M to 2M and these prices are in line with monetary equilibrium predictions. By contrast, prices in the 2M-M treatment do not change or change in the wrong direction in response to a decrease in the money supply from 2M to M. Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 reports mean traded prices in both the DM and CM markets of each M-2M and 2M-M treatment session. In the M-2M treatment sessions we observe that mean DM and CM prices are in a neighborhood of the equilibrium prediction of 2 in the M part and increase to a neighborhood of the equilibrium prediction of 4 in the 2M part (we will be more precise about this below). By contrast in the 2M-M treatment sessions, contrary to equilibrium predictions, DM prices increase from the 2M part to the M part and CM prices are essentially unchanged.
4.12*** 1.46*** 2.597*** 2.136*** 3.955** To quantify these e¤ect more precisely, Table 12 reports a simple regression analysis where the DM traded quantity, q, DM traded prices, p and CM market prices P are regressed on a constant and a dummy variable, 2M which was equal to 1 if the money stock was doubled to 2M and was 0 otherwise (if the money stock was M). Note that by contrast with the prior regression analyses of Tables 5 and 9 we have here disaggregated the data according to the treatment order, i.e., either, M-2M or 2M-M, as we are interested in e¤ects of changes in M on prices and so we do not include a treatment order dummy in this regression analysis. The regression results con…rm Finding 5 that in the M-2M treatment, the change from M to 2M results in no signi…cant change in quantities exchanged in the DM trading round; the coe¢ cient on the constant term is 4.12 which is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and close to the monetary equilibrium prediction of q = 4, but the coe¢ cient on 2M is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero indicating no real e¤ect from the change in the money supply on the quantity exchanged. Also consistent with the neutrality of money proposition, the change from M to 2M results in a signi…cant increase in DM prices from 1.46 to 4.13, which approximates the unique monetary equilibrium prediction of a rise from DM p = 2 to DM p = 4. In the M-2M treatment, the CM price P also increases signi…cantly from 2.597 to 5.628, which is somewhat higher, but in the right direction of the predicted rise from CM P = 2 to CM P = 4 for this treatment. Thus for the M-2M treatment, consistent with the neutrality of money proposition, the doubling of the money supply has no real e¤ects but does result in an approximate doubling of both the DM and CM prices.
By contrast, in the 2M-M treatment, Table 12 reveals that the change from 2M to M has some real e¤ects on DM traded quantities. In particular, real DM traded quantities are signi…cantly higher-by 1.895 units on average-in the …rst 2M part as compared with the second M part of the 2M-M treatment sessions. Also inconsistent with the neutrality of money proposition, DM traded prices are signi…cantly lower in the 2M part of the 2M-M treatment as indicated by the negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the 2M dummy variable and CM prices are una¤ected by the change in the money supply from 2M to M as indicated by the insigni…cance of the coe¢ cient on the 2M dummy variable. The latter …ndings, which stand in contrast to those found for the M-2M treatment, may re ‡ect the fact that subjects in our experiment have limited life experience with decreases in the money supply and an associated de ‡ation of the price level and may not have immediately known how to adjust to this new setting in the limited time frame of our experimental sessions. Alternatively, these …ndings may re ‡ect some kind of behaviorally-based aversion to price reductions as has been documented using …eld data, e.g., by Bewley (1999) . Such …ndings are also broadly consistent with other experimental studies (reviewed in section 2) that exhibited an asymmetric response in nominal prices to positive and negative shocks (e.g., Fehr and Tyran (2001) and Noussair et al. (2012) ).
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This chapter provides further evidence on the coordination role played by monetary exchange in random search environments following up on experiments by Camera and Casari (2014) and Du¤y and Puzzello (2014) by using a within-subject experimental design so as to more carefully explore the impact of monetary regimes relative to non-monetary regimes and the impact of changes in the money supply on real activity and prices. The control of the laboratory, and especially the within-subject experimental design that we employ in this chapter enables us to be clearer about the causal mechanisms underlying real economic activity and price determination. Furthermore, monetary policy experiments of the type we investigate here, namely a doubling of halving of the money supply, are not readily implementable in the …eld, and this fact provides another motivation for our laboratory investigation.
We have found that the presence of money increases real exchange activity relative to the absence of money but that the overall welfare bene…t of introducing money may depend on the order in which money is introduced. Our experimental …ndings also suggest that, consistent with the neutrality of money proposition, a doubling of the money supply has no real e¤ects, and is associated with a doubling of prices. However, inconsistent with that neutrality proposition, we also …nd that a reduction in the money supply by half can have real e¤ects and does not lead to a fall in prices by the same proportion.
As we noted in the introduction, the order of events in the history of human exchange is that gift exchange regimes preceded monetary exchange regimes. In our experiment, the transition from a non-monetary gift exchange regime to a monetary exchange regime is not found to be welfare improving and so an important topic for future research is to understand why this may be the case. One obvious omission that we have already alluded to is that our monetary regime does not involve any legal restriction to use money in exchange (e.g., to pay taxes) and such legal restrictions might have played an important role historically in the transition from gift exchange to monetary exchange systems. A second omission from the gift exchange regime we consider is the use of any kind of accounting or record-keeping credit/debit ledgers that may have obviated the need for a money object, and which were also importantly historically (see Graeber 2011) . A third omission is that we have bypassed a potentially important intermediate step, namely, that of a commodity-money exchange regime where the good used as money has some value in use (utility value) apart from its value in exchange. 15 It may be that the transition from a pure gift exchange regime involving only real costs and bene…ts to a monetary exchange regime involving the further use of …at objects having no real intrinsic value requires an intermediate phase involving commodity money issuance (e.g., gold or silver coins) such as was also observed in the history of monetary exchange. We leave the study of these topics to future research.
consumption, as is also the case in …at money regimes. Welcome to this experiment in the economics of decision making. Funding for this experiment has been provided by the University of Pittsburgh. If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Please, no talking for the duration of today's session.
NM-
There are two parts to today's experimental session We will first go over the instructions for the first part. When we are done, each of you will have to answer a few brief questions to ensure that everyone understands these instructions. You will also have time to ask clarifying questions. Then, you will begin making your decisions using the computer workstations. After the first part is over you will receive instructions for the second part. You can earn money from both parts of today's session as will be made clear in the instructions for each part.
Overview-Part 1
There are 14 people participating in today's session. Each participant will make consuming, producing, buying or selling decisions in a number of sequences. Each sequence consists of an unknown number of periods. Each period consists of two rounds. At the end of each two-round period, the computer program will draw a random number, specifically, an integer in the set {1,2,3,4,5,6}. Each of these six numbers has an equal chance of being chosen; it is like rolling a six-sided die. The program will display the random number chosen on all participants' screens. If the random number drawn is 1,2,3,4 or 5, the sequence will continue with another two-round period. If the random number drawn is 6, the sequence will end. Thus the probability a sequence continues from one period to the next is 5/6 and the probability it ends after each period is 1/6. If a sequence ends, then depending on the time available, a new sequence will begin.
You will start today's experiment with an endowment of 20 points. Over the course of a sequence you may gain or lose points based on the decisions you make as will be explained in detail below. Your point total will carry over from one sequence to the next. Your final point total from all sequences played will determine your earnings for this first part of the experiment. Each point you earn is worth $0.30.
Timing and Pairing
Recall that each period consists of two rounds. In the first round of each new period, the 14 participants will be randomly matched in 7 pairs and make decisions with one another in a Decentralized Meeting. In the second and final round of each period, all 14 participants will interact together in a Centralized Meeting. We will now describe what happens in each of the two rounds of a period.
Round 1: Decentralized Meeting
At the beginning of each Decentralized Meeting-the first round of each period-each participant is randomly paired with one other participant. All pairings are equally likely. In each pair, one participant is randomly chosen to be the Consumer and the other is the Producer. At the start of each Decentralized Meeting round, you are equally likely to be assigned either role; it is as though a coin flip determines whether you are a Producer or Consumer in each round. In the Decentralized Meeting, a perishable good is produced and can be traded. This good is "perishable" because it cannot be carried over into any other round or period. Producers incur a cost in points for producing some quantity of this perishable good which is subtracted from their point total and Consumers receive a benefit in points from consuming some quantity of the perishable good which is added to their point total. Table  1 summarizes how costs and benefits are related to your point earnings. For example, if you are a Producer and agree to produce 2 units of the good, you incur a production cost of 2 points. If you are a Consumer and you succeed in consuming 7 units of the good, you get a benefit of 14.56 points.
Consumers move first and must decide on how many units of the perishable good they want their matched Producer to produce for them-see Figure 1 . Consumers can request any . Producers must decide whether to "Accept" or "Reject" the Consumer's proposal -see Figure 2 . If a Producer clicks the Accept button, the proposed exchange takes place: the Producer produces the requested amount of the good and incurs a cost in points from doing so. The Consumer receives a benefit in points from consumption of the amount of the good produced by the Producer as part of the exchange. If the Producer clicks the Reject button, then no trade takes place: the point balances of both participants will remain unchanged.
After all decisions have been made the results of the Decentralized Meeting (round 1) are revealed. Any exchanges are implemented and we next move on to the Centralized Meeting-round 2.
Round 2: Centralized Meeting
In the second round of a period, all 14 participants have the opportunity to interact in a single Centralized Meeting (there is no pairwise matching in the Centralized Meeting). In the Centralized Meeting, each participant can decide whether to produce-and-sell units of a perishable good called "good X." Participants who choose to produce-and-sell units of good X can further choose to buy-and-consume units of good X. Participants can also choose not to produce or buy any units of good X.
The first decision screen you face in the Centralized Meeting is shown in Figure 3 . There If you offer to produce   0 units of good X, you may be able to sell those units of good X at the market price,  , to buyers of good X if there is some demand for good X (as explained below). After all participants have chosen how many units of good X to offer to produce, those participants who entered   0 units of good X are asked on a second, Centralized Meeting decision screen whether they would like to bid to buy-and-consume any units of good X -see Figure 4 . Each participant can bid to buy-and-consume any number of units of good X between 0 and  inclusive (fractions allowed), where  is again the quantity of good X they chose to produce-and-sell. Call the amount you offer to bid to buy-and-consume units of good X, "", so that 0 ≤  ≤  If you do not want to bid to buy and consume any units of good X then enter 0 in the input box of the second Centralized Meeting screen. When you are done making this choice, click the red submit button. Table 2 shows the points that you can earn from producing-and-selling or from buyingand-consuming units of good X. For instance, if you choose to produce and sell 2 units of good X and you are able to sell those units (more on this below), then producing those two units will cost you 2 points. If you are able to buy and consume 7 units of good X (again, see below), this will give you a benefit of 7 points.
After all participants have clicked the red submit button, the computer program calculates the total amount of good X that all participants have offered to produce and sell; call this: "Total Amount of Good X Produced". The program also calculates the total number of 
The first term, −, represents the cost to you of the  units of good X that you offered to produce and sell. The second term,  , represents the number of units of good X that you were able to buy and consume given your bid, , and the market determined price,  . Notice several things. First, if − +  is negative (equivalently, if   −  is positive 1 ), so that you are a net seller of good X, then you lose points from the Centralized Meeting according to formula (1). Second, if − +  is positive (equivalently, if   −  is negative) so that you are a net buyer of good X, then you earn additional points from the Centralized Meeting according to formula (1). Thus, if   0, those who are net seller-producers of good X will leave the Centralized Meeting with lower point totals, while those who are net buyerconsumers of good X will leave the Centralized Meeting with higher point totals. Finally, note that if  = 0, or if you do not produce or bid for good X in the Centralized Meeting, then your point balance remains unchanged.
Players' new (or unchanged) point totals carry over to the Decentralized Meeting of the next period of the sequence, if there is a next period, which depends on the random number drawn. If the sequence does not continue with a new period, then all participants' point totals for the sequence are final. Depending on the time available, a new sequence may begin.
Information
After each Decentralized Meeting round, all participants will be informed about their point earnings and those of the participant with whom they were paired. Nobody will ever be informed about the identity of the participant with whom they were paired in any round of this experiment. Following round 2 (Centralized Meeting) you will see your point totals both for the Decentralized Meeting round 1, the Centralized Meeting round 2, the period (rounds 1 and 2 combined) and your cumulative point total for the current sequence. For your convenience, on each decision screen you will see a history of your decisions in prior rounds of the Decentralized Meeting (DM) or the Centralized Meeting (CM).
Determination of your Earnings
At the end of the first part of today's session, your point total from all sequences played, including the initial 20 points you were given at the start of the experiment, will be converted into dollars at the rate of 1 point=$0.30. You will have a chance to earn additional payments in the second part of today's session. i. Participants are randomly matched in pairs with one member of the pair randomly chosen to be the Consumer and the other chosen to be the Producer. Both roles are equally likely. ii. Consumers decide how many units of a perishable good to request from the Producer with whom they are paired.
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iii. Producers decide whether to accept or reject the proposal of their matched Consumer. iv. If the proposal is accepted, the Consumer's point earnings are increased as in Table 1 . The Producer's point earnings are decreased by the cost of producing the amount of the good agreed upon. v. Participants are informed about the point earnings in their pair. Round 2 Centralized Meeting:
i. All participants interact together in the Centralized Meeting to decide whether to produce-and-sell, buy-and-consume or not participate in the market for a perishable good X. ii. Participants who choose to produce-and-sell enter a quantity, , of units they wish to produce for sale. Participants who enter a positive quantity   0 are then asked whether they would like to bid to buy-and-consume units of good X. A participant's bid  can be any amount between 0 and , inclusive, where  is the quantity they offered to produce and sell of good X. iii. The market price,  , of good X is determined as the ratio of the total amount bid for good X to the total amount of good X produced. If there are no bids (demand) for good X or no amount of good X produced (supply) then  = 0. 3. At the end of each 2-round period, a number (integer) from 1-6 is randomly drawn and determines whether the sequence continues with another 2-round period. If a 1,2,3,4, or 5 is drawn the sequence continues. If a 6 is drawn, the sequence ends. Thus, there is a 5/6 chance that a sequence continues and a 1/6 chance that it ends.
4. If a sequence continues, then a new period begins. Point balances carry over from the end of the prior period and participants are randomly paired anew in the Decentralized Meeting (round 1) of the new period. If a sequence ends, then depending on the time available, a new sequence may begin.
5. Points accumulate over all sequences. At the end of the session, each participant's cumulative point total from this first part of the session will be converted into cash at the rate of 1 point=$0.30.
Questions?
Now is the time for questions about these instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Quiz
Before we start, we would like you to answer a few questions that are meant to review the rules of today's experiment. The numbers that appear in these questions are for illustration purposes only; the actual numbers in the experiment may be different. When you are done answering these questions, raise your hand and an experimenter will check your answers.
1. How many rounds are there in each period?
2. Suppose it is period 2 of a sequence. What is the probability that the sequence continues with a period 3? Would your answer be any different if we replaced period 2 with period 12 and period 3 with period 13? Circle one: yes/no.
3. Can you choose whether you are a producer or consumer in the first round of a period, i.e., the Decentralized Meeting?
4. Can you choose whether you are a producer/seller or buyer/consumer in the second round of a period, i.e. the Centralized Meeting?
5. Suppose in the Decentralized Meeting that you are the Consumer. You propose that the producer produce 2 units of the perishable good and the Producer accepts your proposal.
a. What are your additional point earnings this round? (Use Table 1) b. How many points does it cost the Producer for agreeing to your proposal? (Use Table 1) 6. Suppose that in the Centralized Meeting you offered to produce and sell  = 4 units and you bid  = 1 to buy and consume units of good X. After all participants have made their decisions, it turns out that the market price,  = 12.
a. How many points does it cost you to produce and sell the 4 units? (Use Table 2) b. How many units of good X were you able to buy-and-consume with your bid of 1? (use the formula  ) How many points is this worth? (Use Table 2) c. What are your total points from the Centralized meeting? (use the formula: − +  )
7. Suppose that in the Centralized Meeting you offered to produce and sell  = 5 units and you bid  = 5 to buy and consume units of good X. After all participants have made their decisions, it turns out that the market price,  = 1.
a. How many points does it cost you to produce and sell the 5 units? (Use Table 2) b. How many units of good X were you able to buy-and-consume with your bid of 5? (use the formula  ) How many points is this worth? (Use Table 2 
Overview-Part 2
The second part of the experiment is exactly the same as the first part of the experiment in that there are 14 participants making consuming, producing, buying or selling decisions in sequences of two-round periods. The probability a sequence continues from one period to the next remains 5/6 and you will also start this second part of the session with an endowment of 20 points. You earn or lose points each period according to the decisions you make, and your points earned from all sequences played in this second part will be converted into dollars at the same rate as before, with each point worth $0.30. The main change from the first part is that in this second part of the session each of the 14 participants will begin each new sequence of periods with an endowment of 8 "tokens". The total number of tokens, (14 × 8 = 112) is fixed for the duration of each sequence. Participants may choose whether or not to use tokens for exchange purposes as discussed below. Tokens have no value in terms of points.
As before in the first round of each new period, the 14 participants are randomly matched in 7 pairs and make decisions with one another in a Decentralized Meeting. In the second and final round of each period, all 14 participants interact together in a Centralized Meeting. The tokens can be used in both the Decentralized and Centralized Meeting rounds as explained in the next two sections.
Round 1: Decentralized Meeting
As before participants are randomly paired. In each pair, one participant is randomly chosen to be the Consumer and the other is the Producer. At the start of each Decentralized Meeting round, you are equally likely to be assigned either role.
As before, the Consumer moves first. The Consumer is informed about his own token holdings as well as the token holdings of the matched Producer. Then the Consumer decides how many units of the perishable good they want their matched Producer to produce for them and how many tokens they are willing to give the Producer for this amount of goods -see Figure 5 . As before, Consumers can request any amount of the good between 0 and 22 units inclusive (fractions allowed) and can now offer to give the Producer between 0 and the maximum number of tokens they currently have available, inclusive (fractions allowed). After all Consumers have made their decisions, Producers are informed of their own token holdings as well as the token holdings of their matched Consumer. Producers are then presented with their matched Consumer's proposal (amount of good requested and tokens offered in exchange). Producers must decide whether to "Accept" or "Reject" the Consumer's proposal -see Figure 6 . If a Producer clicks the Accept button, the proposed exchange takes place: the Producer produces the requested amount of the good and incurs a cost in points from doing so as given in Table 1 , but now the Producer receives the amount of tokens, if any, the Consumer has offered in exchange. The Consumer receives a benefit in points from consumption of the amount of the good produced as indicated in Table 1 After all decisions have been made the results of the Decentralized Meeting (round 1) are revealed. Any exchanges are implemented and we next move on to the Centralized Meeting-round 2.
Round 2: Centralized Meeting
In the second round of a period, all 14 participants again interact in a single Centralized Meeting. Each participant carries with him/her the token holdings that s/he had as of the end of round 1 (the Decentralized Meeting) after any exchanges have taken place in that round. In the Centralized Meeting, each participant now decides whether to 1) produceand-sell units of the perishable "good X" in exchange for tokens, 2) use their tokens to bid for units of good X, 3) do both, or 4) do neither. The points you can earn from producingand-selling or from buying-and-consuming units of good X are the same as in the first part and are given in Table 2 . Notice that, differently from the first part, if you produce-and-sell units of good X, you incur costs in points according to Table 2 , but you now receive tokens in exchange for any units you are able to sell. Also, to bid for units of Good X you now use your tokens and in exchange you receive units of Good X if you are able to buy such units (depending on supply and the market price as detailed below). The value of units of Good X is given in Table 2 . The decision screen you face in the Centralized Meeting is shown in Figure 3 .
You enter your produce-and-sell decision in the first box and the amount of your tokens you would like to bid for Good X in the second box. Note that you cannot bid more tokens than you have available. If you don't want to produce-and-sell units of Good X or if you don't want to bid your tokens for units of Good X, then enter 0 in the appropriate box(es). After all participants have clicked the red submit button, the computer program calculates the total amount of good X that all participants have offered to produce and sell; call this: "Total Amount of Good X Produced." The program also calculates the total number of tokens bid toward buying units of good X by all participants; call this: "Total Amount of Tokens Bid for Good X." Finally the program calculates the market price of good X in terms of tokens as follows:
If Total Amount of Good X Produced 0 and if Total Amount of Tokens Bid for Good X 0, then the market price of good X,  , is determined by:  = Total Amount of Tokens Bid for Good X Total Amount of Good X Produced  If Total Amount of Good X Produced = 0 or if Total Amount of Tokens Bid for Good X = 0 (or both are equal to 0), then  = 0
Notice that you do not know the value of  when deciding whether to produce or bid tokens for units of good X;  is determined only after all participants have made their Centralized Meeting decisions. Once the market price,  , is determined, if   0 then individuals who participated in the Centralized Meeting earn points according to the formula:
Centralized Meeting payoff in points = − + 
The first term, −, represents the cost to you of producing and selling  units of good X. The second term,  , represents the number of units good X you were able to buy and consume given your bid of  tokens and the market determined price,  . In addition, if   0, each individual who participated in the Centralized Meeting will see their own token balance adjusted as follows:
New Token Balance = Old Token Balance +   − 
Notice several things. First, if − +  is negative (equivalently, if   −  is positive 2 ), so that you are a net seller of good X, then you lose points from the Centralized Meeting according to the formula (2). However, at the same time, your new token balance increases relative to your old token balance by the positive amount   −  according to the formula (3). Second, if − +  is positive (equivalently, if   −  is negative) so that you are a net buyer of good X, then you earn additional points from the Centralized Meeting according to formula (2). However, at the same time, your new token balance decreases relative to your old token balance by the negative amount   −  according to formula (3). Thus, if   0, those who are net seller-producers of good X will leave the Centralized Meeting with higher token balances but with lower point totals, while those who are net buyer-consumers of good X will leave the Centralized Meeting with lower token balances but with higher point totals. Finally, note that if  = 0, or if you do not produce or bid tokens for good X in the Centralized Meeting, then your point and token balances remain unchanged.
Players' new (or unchanged) token balances and point totals will carry over to the Decentralized Meeting of the next period of the sequence, if there is a next period, which depends on the random number drawn. If the sequence does not continue with a new period, then all participants' token balances are set to zero, and their point totals for the sequence are final. Depending on the time available, a new sequence may then begin. At the beginning of each new sequence, each participant is given 8 tokens.
Information
After each round, participants will be informed about their point totals and their token holdings. After round 1 (Decentralized Meeting) participants will also be informed about the point totals and the token holdings of the participant they were paired with. All interactions remain anonymous. After round 2 (Centralized Meeting) you will see your token and point totals both for the Decentralized Meeting round 1, the Centralized Meeting round 2, the period (rounds 1 and 2 combined) and your cumulative point total for the current sequence. For your convenience, on each decision screen you will see a history of your decisions in prior rounds of the Decentralized Meeting (DM) or the Centralized Meeting (CM).
Determination of your Earnings
At the end of this second part of today's session, your point total from all sequences played, including the initial 20 points you were given at the start of this second part, will be converted into dollars at the rate of 1 point=$0.30. You will be paid your total earnings from the first and second parts of today's session plus a $5 show-up payment in cash and in private.
Summary
Part 2 is the same as part 1 except that:
• Each player starts each new sequence with 8 tokens. The total supply of tokens remains constant at 14 × 8 = 112 tokens over all rounds of a sequence. Tokens have no value in terms of points.
• In the DM, Consumers' proposals now include both an amount of the good the Producer is asked to produce and an amount of tokens the Consumer offers to give the Producer in exchange. As before, Producers can either accept or reject the Consumer's proposal.
• In the CM, all 14 participants meet and individually decide whether to produce and sell units of Good X in exchange for tokens and/or to bid their available tokens for units of Good X. All sales of units of Good X for tokens are at the single market-determined price, 
In all other respects, this second part of the experiment is the same as the first part.
Questions?
